Salvation, or Authoritarian Revenge? Azerbaijan's Unfinished Democratic Transformation

Akif Qurbanov

By Akif Qurbanov

Akif Qurbanov, the spokesperson for the Third Republic Platform who is currently detained under the "Toplum TV case," has written an article concerning National Salvation Day. We present the article, published by the Khar Center, in its original form:

This article analyses the narrative of "National Salvation" Day—considered the political and ideological foundation of authoritarian Azerbaijan—against the background of the global patterns of the post-communist transition period. It compares the successful lustration and transitional justice experiences of Central and Eastern European countries with those of the post-Soviet space.

Attention is drawn to the historic consequences of failing to exclude the old nomenclature from the system and failing to carry out necessary constitutional reforms in Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. The analysis argues that the events of June 1993 were not a salvation of the nation, but rather a systematic revenge by the KGB elite and the post-Soviet nomenclature. It proposes the necessity of a new political vision based on republican principles and the collective will of society to ensure a transition to real democracy in the country.

The analysis approaches the officially celebrated "National Salvation Day" in Azerbaijan through the framework of political analysis. Its goal is to audit its ideological foundations, identify the real causes of failure during the transition period, and support future democratisation.

Furthermore, this analysis attempts to answer questions such as: What is the role of lustration during the transition from authoritarianism to democracy? What is the institutional difference between Central and Eastern European countries and Azerbaijan in the transition process that began alongside the collapse of the USSR? And what were the transition-era mistakes made in Azerbaijan?

National Salvation, or Nomenclature Revenge?

In our country, 15 June is officially celebrated as National Salvation Day. The ideological and political narrative of the Aliyev regime is built upon this day. It is claimed that on 15 June 1993, the state and the people were saved from chaos and civil war—that a national salvation occurred. All of this is attributed solely to the political competence, ability, foresight, and innate talent of one individual. That individual is also considered the builder and founder of modern Azerbaijan, and is called the "national leader". To instil this discourse into public opinion, parallels are frequently drawn with the example of Atatürk in Turkish history.

Let us look at both the events that occurred 33 years ago—the mutiny of 4 June and the formalisation of the coup on 15 June—as well as the subsequent processes, to see if the outcome was indeed a "National Salvation" or a revenge.

To answer this question, we must look at the geography where communist-led regimes held power, specifically the countries of the Socialist Pact (Warsaw Pact) led by the USSR. At the same time, it will be necessary to conduct a comparative analysis of what occurred in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and the former Soviet republics, excluding the three Baltic states.

The overthrow of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe began almost simultaneously in 1989. This process first started in Poland: in February–April, the communist government sat at the negotiating table with representatives of the opposition "Solidarity" (Solidarność) organisation, and semi-free parliamentary elections were held in June (ENRS, 2005). In the same month in Hungary, the government initiated a reform process by inviting the opposition to discussions. In the autumn, peaceful mass protests began in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. In Romania, the changes occurred violently: in December 1989, the ruling regime opened fire on peaceful demonstrators, leaving 1,104 dead and 3,552 wounded. On 25 December, the country's president, Nicolae Ceaușescu, and his wife, Elena, were executed by firing squad following a military tribunal decision (Editura Lumen, 2006).

In the Baltic countries, the freedom struggle for independence had begun in 1988, and Lithuania was the first Soviet republic to declare independence on 11 March 1990. The victory of the "Sajūdis" organisation in the Supreme Soviet elections resulted in the adoption of a declaration of independence and the declaration of the country's annexation into the USSR as illegal.

In August 1991, after the "GKChP" (State Committee on the State of Emergency) coup took place in Moscow to remove USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev from power, Latvia and Estonia also declared their independence (ERR News, 2024).

The transition from a totalitarian system to democracy involves the protection of human rights, the guarantee of freedoms, the creation of new institutional structures, the separation of state power into three branches (executive, legislative, and judicial), the division of powers and mutual checks, and the creation of mechanisms that ensure fundamental changes in the nature of state-society relations.

In some CEE countries, a democratic constitution was adopted; in others, significant amendments were made to the existing constitution. The new constitutional order guaranteed human rights and freedoms, established the principle of rotating power through free and fair elections, and defined functional division, mutual control, and limitation among the branches of power. In place of the Communist Party's "single-handed" rule and planned economy, institutions of a free market and liberal democracy (free elections, an independent parliament, an independent judiciary, and law enforcement/armed forces open to public oversight) were established. Former "people's democracy" societies gained civil and political rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, assembly, and association, the right to participate in political activity, the right to vote and be elected, etc.).

The main distinguishing feature of democratic transformation in CEE countries was that the post-communist elite sought to take concrete steps to dismantle the repressive legacy of the regime. The measures involving transitional justice mainly consisted of: ensuring the rule of law, creating a social contract on new foundations, rejecting non-democratic practices in the process of transitioning from an authoritarian or totalitarian system to a democratic one, overcoming the legacy of the past (i.e. recognising injustice towards all victims of the regime), rehabilitating the unjustly prosecuted, providing public vindication and material compensation for those subjected to repression, returning confiscated property to its owners (restitution), and bringing to justice those who violated human rights and abused power (lustration).

Lustration is a legal restriction and ban against those who held positions in the former government, the political elite, and those who collaborated with them in various structures (education system, media, etc.) from holding office in public service or the public sphere. These measures are administrative in nature and range from revealing the names of people associated with repressive institutions and the secret police, to bans on holding office in the state, public, and sometimes even the private sector (Azadliq Radiosu, 2013).

In the lustration process, identifying individuals is primarily made possible by opening the archives of the Communist Party and the secret police.

Goals and Motives of Lustration Supporters

Revealing the Truth About the Past and Restoring Justice

The primary goal of the lustration process and the opening of associated archives is to uncover the truth about human rights violations and state terror. In CEE countries, requesting information about the scope of the crime and its participants was considered a basic requirement for restoring justice. The logic behind this was that accountability lies at the heart of democracy. Accountability requires and forces the uncovering of the truth, making known the suffering of people, the state, and the agents who caused that suffering. This represents the formulation of new principles of legitimacy.

The Revenge of Anti-Democratic Forces and the Danger of a Return to Totalitarianism

The first stage of democratic changes is accompanied by a serious threat—the probability of revenge by representatives of the former nomenclature and special services. Usually, they are ready to do anything to bring about a counter-revolution and restore the previous totalitarian order. The lustration process prevents precisely this.

Wild Lustration" and the Threat of Blackmail

One of the threats to the new order is that people who have connections with former security agencies and hold important posts in the new system become weak links for blackmail. They can face the threat of kompromat (compromising material) via archive files at any moment, turning them into tools of pressure. Such individuals can be used under the threat of exposure in activities that contradict state interests and undermine the foundations of the democratic system.

This fear slowed down the pace of the process in many countries, creating a situation called "wild or uncontrolled lustration". Archive data was leaked to the media in an unregulated manner, used as compromising material, some documents were destroyed, and some were sold on the black market (Kieran Williams, 2007). Therefore, systematic lustration measures are of great importance in preventing and regulating a chaotic process.

National Security Threats: Isolating Former Collaborators from the New System

When effective regulation of archive documents is not carried out, it creates the risk of files falling into the hands of foreign intelligence agencies, preparing the ground for a threat to national security. For example, in late 1995 and early 1996, Polish Prime Minister Józef Oleksy was accused of collaborating with Soviet and Russian intelligence. The scandal resulted in his resignation (Jan de Weydenthal, 1996).

Restoration of the Old Nomenclature Network and the Strengthening of Their Economic-Political Influence

During the transformation from totalitarianism to democracy, it became clear that the former elite retained its influence in the new system, continuing to work in important state positions, seizing the financial structures of strategic industrial sectors and large corporations, and using their connections and resources to obtain huge profits and properties from the privatisation process. Therefore, both representatives of the new elite and the country's population viewed lustration as a process to dismantle the former nomenclature network, reduce its political-economic influence, and prevent its political power from growing.

Defence of Democracy

In countries where communist regimes were ended, the lustration process was viewed as a tool to defend a democratic system whose foundations were still fragile.

The idea of defending democracy was also supported by representatives of the European Court of Justice. This institution emphasised in its rulings that democratic states are justified in demanding loyalty to constitutional principles from public officials. The Council of Europe's Venice Commission has also repeatedly noted that a state based on a constitution has the right to defend a newly emerging democracy (Uwe Backes, 2006).

Resolution 1096, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in 1996, is titled "measures to dismantle the heritage of former communist totalitarian systems". It establishes a connection between the defence of democratic development and the adoption of lustration legislation. It also describes the criteria for measures that comply with the rule of law and the principle of a state based on the rule of law (PACE, 1996).

Supporters of lustration in CEE countries approached the process as an opportunity for openness and transparency in public institutions, as well as a way to restore public trust. The right to receive broad information about representatives of the public interest was accepted as one of the main pillars of a democratic state. At the same time, the target was not to punish, but to restore citizen trust in elected representatives, because trust is considered a fundamental principle in a democratic system.

Lustration Mechanisms and the Opening of Archives

In CEE countries, the lustration process was implemented in various forms and was quite different from one another in terms of comprehensiveness.

Harsh Lustration – Germany and the Czech Republic

Early and harsh lustration was applied in Germany and the Czech Republic. The de-communisation process carried out through these programmes was conducted consistently and rapidly (Bundesarchiv, 2021).

Soft Lustration – Poland and Hungary

A soft lustration option was chosen in Poland and Hungary, where the transition to democracy took place against the background of compromises achieved through negotiations between the communist party and the opposition. Therefore, unlike in Germany and Czechoslovakia, the de-communisation process was conducted with less determination and consistency.

Lustration Without Archives – Baltic Republics

The situation in the Baltic countries was different from that in the CEE, because most of the KGB archives had been moved from the union countries to the centre in Moscow. Therefore, special personnel selection mechanisms were developed to prevent communists and individuals associated with special services from being represented in government. In Latvia and Estonia, the former political elite was phased out of levers of influence through citizenship laws (Una Bergmane, 2018).

Delayed Lustration – Romania and Slovakia

In Romania, after Ceaușescu, and in Slovakia, after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the political forces that came to power consisted of politicians who opposed the de-communisation process. Therefore, transitional justice measures in these two countries were adopted by the opposition that came to power in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The Experience of Russia and Other Soviet Republics

In Russia, lustration was rejected. Unlike CEE countries, transitional justice was rarely demanded throughout the post-Soviet period. Although President Yeltsin issued decrees suspending the activities of the Communist Party and transferring its property to the state (Soviethistory, 1991), he immediately promised that no communist would be persecuted in Russia. He repeatedly noted that administration in the country was in the hands of professionals. By abandoning lustration, he actually protected himself and his close circle. This was because he himself had been the First Secretary of the Sverdlovsk Oblast for more than 10 years. Restrictive measures to be applied to the former party elite would have had to apply to him as well.

As for the parliament, the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies, elected on 4 March 1990—before the USSR was dissolved—retained their existence. Therefore, there was no chance of supporting any legislative initiative regarding measures to clear the field of the former elite. Although hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets in 1991 protesting the GKChP event with the slogan "Down with the CPSU!" (Doloy KPSS!), free parliamentary elections were not held either after that event or after the USSR was de-jure dissolved in December. This was extremely necessary for a democratic transition, and its failure to occur had a negative impact on Russia's socio-political life, laying the foundation for a dual-power crisis in the country. The confrontation between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet resulted in the shelling of the parliament building in the autumn of 1993, which subsequently brought an end to Russia's reform project.

The root of the problem stemmed from the constitution of the USSR adopted in 1978. According to this document, which remained in force until the collapse of the USSR, the actual centre of power in the country was the Congress of People's Deputies. Transition scholars Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan note that if elections had been held at all levels in the autumn of 1991, the "Democratic Russia" movement supporting Yeltsin and those united around it would have won (Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, 1996). This would have provided a solid foundation for radical market reforms. The President would have received serious support from the legislative power to shape democratic reforms. During that period, Yeltsin's popularity was indeed high and would have been sufficient to win an election. However, instead of starting reforms in this direction, he took additional powers from the congress to implement economic reforms. With this decision, Yeltsin endangered not only the post-communist economic project but also crucial liberal economic reforms due to his failure to form the necessary institutional environment. By doing so, he also prevented the development of parliamentarism (Kharcenter, 2025).

Another obstacle to the implementation of transitional justice measures in Russia was the absence of public forces supporting such calls. Among representatives of the liberal public, including former dissidents, the idea that lustration was dangerous and unnecessary was dominant. There was a public opinion opposed to reckoning with the past, calling it a "witch hunt". In the leadership of civil society, including "Memorial", the thought of calling lustration an "act of revenge", "Great Terror", or "Red Terror" and comparing it with the repressions of the Bolshevik era dominated. Another common opinion about the uselessness of lustration legislation in Russia was that it was supposedly impossible to separate perpetrators from victims in Soviet society.

Despite all of this, although they constituted a absolute minority, there were supporters of lustration in post-Soviet Russia. For example, Boris Pustintsev, head of the St. Petersburg organisation "Citizens' Control", openly supported this idea. In early 1993, Galina Starovoytova, co-chair of the "Democratic Russia" movement and a people's deputy, presented to the Supreme Soviet a draft federal law "On the temporary prohibition of professional activities of persons who implemented the policy of the totalitarian regime." However, neither the "Democratic Russia" majority in parliament nor other deputies supported the bill. Starovoytova, who submitted the document to the State Duma again in 1997, faced the same situation. On 20 November 1998, she was assassinated, and her draft law remained the sole initiative (Journal of Democracy, 1999).

In August 1991, Yeltsin signed a decree on transferring the archives of the Party and the KGB to the state. A special commission was created in this regard, and Colonel-General Dmitry Volkogonov, who had worked as the head of the political administration of the Navy, was appointed chairman. That commission worked for two years, but its activity was virtually ineffective. Amy Knight, who researched the activities of the Soviet special services, wrote in the autumn of 1993: "Although the KGB was dissolved at the end of 1991, the state security apparatus created in its place showed a strong interest in keeping the archives and did everything to prevent those documents from being declassified. At the same time, Yeltsin himself made no effort to implement his decree. The Russian president completely distanced himself from the resolution of this issue" (Amy Knight, 1993).

In April 1992, the Law "On Operational-Search Activities" was adopted. On 5 July 1995, the State Duma adopted this document in a new edition. Information regarding operations, agency activities, and the names of individuals collaborating with the agencies was declared a "state secret". This became the most serious obstacle to working with archive data. In November 1991, Yeltsin signed the Law "On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repressions". However, this too remained on paper. As a result, what Galina Starovoytova had warned about in early 1993 regarding the revenge of the nomenclature occurred. In the end, power fell into the hands of Putin and other representatives of the security structures.

The Examples of Georgia and Ukraine

In later years, Georgia, which started its democratisation process, took steps in this direction, although they were quite delayed. In 2011, the parliament unanimously adopted a law called the "Freedom Charter". Employees of the USSR security agencies, and officials of the Communist Party and Komsomol organisations, were banned from being elected or holding positions in state bodies. These bans were also applied to the higher education system, the judicial system, and the leadership of public television (OSVV, 2011).

During the transition period after Viktor Yanukovych, who was overthrown as a result of the Euromaidan events, the lustration process also began in Ukraine. Nothing had been done in this direction during the much earlier Yushchenko era.

In April 2014, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law "On Restoring Trust in the Judiciary of Ukraine" (RADA, 2014). In this process, considered a lustration of judges, the main goal was to evaluate judicial decisions, Ukrainian legislation in the field of human rights, and their compliance with international norms. In October of that year, the Law "On Government Cleansing" was adopted (RADA, 2014). Ukraine approached this issue as a consolidation of society and the elimination of negative consequences associated with the activities of the previous authoritarian regime. That law aimed to restore trust in government and form appropriate conditions for building a system of state bodies meeting European standards, banning former officials and their supporters from working in the public sector and local self-government for 10 years. This ban applied both to those who worked in the Soviet era and to individuals who held positions in the Yanukovych administration in 2010–2014, as well as those who violated human rights and freedoms during the Maidan events.

The result of that lustration process was seen in February 2022—in the unity of the Ukrainian government, military, and people against the Russian invasion. Russia could not create a division in Ukraine's political leadership and state institutions because a serious purge had been carried out. However, in Ukraine's helplessness against the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the events in Donetsk and Luhansk, this very factor played a serious role. Similarly, the "Berkut" opening fire on peaceful people on Maidan was also connected with the former nomenclature.

The Azerbaijani Experience

Unfortunately, a systematic lustration process regulated by law did not take place in Azerbaijan as it did in Central and Eastern European countries. In 1992–1993, during the reign of the Azerbaijani Popular Front (AXC), there were only glimmers of lustration in a peculiar "Azerbaijani experience" (or example of failure), which did not take on a systematic character and occurred only at the level of occasional political statements, closed discussions, and chaotic personnel changes (Audrey L. Altstadt, 2017).

The reason for this was that new parliamentary elections were not held in the country, and the decision-making legislative body (the Milli Majlis) was a 50-member "National Council" faction where the ratio of forces was equal (25/25) between the post-Soviet nomenclature and the Popular Front members. Representatives of the communist elite blocked the idea of lustration in every way, as it would have meant their political suicide.

In 1992, when the AXC came to power, one of the biggest topics of discussion was the opening of former KGB archives. There was a serious demand in society to find out who was an agent and who was a traitor.

However, the leadership of the AXC (especially the key figures) opposed the opening of the archives. According to their argument, while the war was going on in Karabakh, opening the archives could split society from within and lead to a civil war. This was because the informant network included a large number of well-known intellectuals, religious figures, and political personalities. Keeping the archives closed effectively meant rejecting lustration from its foundation.

Elchibey's "National Reconciliation" Policy

President Abulfaz Elchibey was by nature against repressive and radical methods. Instead of declaring the post-communist elite an outright enemy, he tried to involve them in the construction of the new independent state. At that time, Elchibey chose the formula of "forgetting the past and looking to the future" instead of punishing them, which resulted in the word "lustration" not even being mentioned in official documents.

Thus, the Azerbaijani experience of 1992–1993 is an "experience of non-lustration". Because the old elite was not legally excluded from the system, during the crisis of June 1993, that nomenclature and special service network easily consolidated, seized power again, and secured its political revenge.

In his book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, political scientist Samuel Huntington notes that the decision to lustrate is related to the type of society transitioning to democracy; he notes that the main role in this process is played by the former elite and the opposition. The researcher identifies three types of countries based on the roles of ruling and opposition groups in the democratisation process (Samuel Huntington, 1991):

Transformation: The ruling elite takes the initiative to build democracy and subsequently implements the transformation of the regime (examples of Hungary and Bulgaria).

Replacement: In countries where opposition groups take power, the authoritarian regime collapses or is overthrown, resulting in replacement (examples of East Germany and Romania).

Transplacement: Democratisation occurs as a result of joint action by the government and opposition groups (examples of Poland and Czechoslovakia).

According to Huntington, transitional justice measures are possible in those countries where replacement takes place in political administration. That is, the former elite is removed from power against its will. In other cases, the former communist leadership either initiated the reform process itself or went to negotiations with the opposition, obtaining a tendency of "forgive and forget" for itself.

Another researcher, Helga Welsh, emphasises that success or failure in transitional justice measures depends on politicians—that is, the distribution of political forces on the field in the post-communist period. The key point is: can representatives of the former elite and political successors of the communist party remain in power? The weaker the electoral strength of the former communists, the faster the de-communisation process is accelerated. For example, in Hungary (1994–98, 2002–2010), Lithuania (1992–96), Poland (1993–97), and Romania (1990–96, 2000–2004), former communists were present in the governments that started reforms. They were able to successfully stand in opposition to the de-communisation process (Helga A. Welsh, 1996).

Researcher John Moran interprets the issue using Albert Hirschman's terminology, emphasising that the important aspect in the post-communist period is the factors of "voice" (protest) and "exit" (emigration) regarding measures of reckoning with the past. According to his logic, in countries where the communist regime took a relatively liberal approach to processes, allowed protests, and left opportunities for exit abroad, the probability of adopting mild measures regarding transitional justice was high (Poland, Hungary). Where this was not allowed (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany), the adoption of measures of reckoning with the past was demanded more harshly (John Moran, 1994).

Lavinia Stan, in her research on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, emphasises that if a country was ruled through ideological severity and repression under the communist regime, transitional justice measures are more radical (Czech Republic, East Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). In countries where cooperation and certain reforms were allowed (Poland, Hungary), the process goes relatively softly. On the other hand, in countries where the opposition is very weak, very little impulse is observed for the implementation of transitional justice (Lavinia Stan, 2009).

Nadia Nedelsky, who investigated the processes in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, identifies a correlation between the level of legitimacy of the communist system and transitional justice measures: "The higher the legitimacy of the previous regime in society, the lower the motivation of the community to achieve justice in relation to the government. This means that society will allow the former elite to return to the political scene. During the transition period, it will not be particularly inclined to achieve justice regarding it" (Nadia Nedelsky, 2004).

The analysis of post-communist transformation shows that the adoption and implementation of transitional justice measures dictate the existence of at least two factors: first, the existence of functional democratic institutions and the guarantee of power rotation through free and fair elections; second, the existence of an influential political force—the emergence of a counter-elite and politicians who support lustration, achieving the consolidation of a number sufficient to adopt the corresponding law.

As seen from the experience of Russia and other post-Soviet countries, including Azerbaijan, the sole factor is not that power rotation did not occur through elections. In these countries, political forces interested in transitional justice measures have simply not emerged.

Scientific and political research on these measures shows that the effects of lustration on the democratic consolidation of society and trust in government institutions are significant. As a logical continuation of this, we can say that the more comprehensive the lustration and the harsher the political penalties, the higher the level of democracy.

Although 35 years have passed since the collapse of the post-Soviet system, tolerance towards the repressive institutions of the totalitarian regime and the lack of personnel restrictions regarding participation in crimes in our country, Russia, and other republics (excluding Armenia) gradually served to restore the violent practices of the Soviet era. The rejection of lustration and other measures resulted in a significant part of power and property remaining in the hands of the former nomenclature.

Against the background of the successful democratisation experience of CEE countries, the negative experience of Azerbaijan and other post-Soviet countries clearly shows that without serious institutional reforms, without fully opening the archives of the bureaucrats of the previous regime, and without other transitional justice measures, a transition to democracy from totalitarianism and authoritarianism is hardly possible.

As I noted above, in our country, which gained independence in 1991, neither a guarantee for rotation of power through democratic elections was created, nor were functional democratic institutions formed. Although there was an influential political force (the AXC) and a counter-elite, politicians supporting lustration did not emerge, and not even sufficient consolidation attempts were shown to adopt the corresponding law.

After the elections to the Supreme Soviet in 1990, the majority belonged to the communists. Although the 50-member National Council ("Demblok") was a force with the power to influence political decisions, it was not strong enough to pass decisions for lustration measures in parliament, or they did not even have such a thought themselves. The team of Ayaz Mutallibov, the former first secretary declared president in 1991, was also the old elite. The Elchibey team, which came to power in 1992, could not clean out the former elite either, or they considered this risky for themselves. They could neither remove them from high positions, nor open the archives, nor dissolve the Supreme Soviet and hold new parliamentary elections during the period of Elchibey's high approval rating. They could not even take steps for constitutional reforms. I am describing the actual situation here without touching upon the objective (the Karabakh war) and subjective (their visions, desires) reasons.

As a result, the Elchibey government faced a communist revenge (which is one of the main threats in the transition to democracy) and, as expected, preparations for this revenge began with the establishment of the YAP (New Azerbaijan Party) in 1992, created by Heydar Aliyev—a KGB general who had been a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the USSR—at the initiative of the "91s" from the former elite. In the June 1993 mutiny, the military unit led by Surat Huseynov created a government crisis in the country. Consequently, represented by Aliyev and Huseynov, the former communist party, KGB, and GRU elite consolidated and "took" first the leadership of the parliament (where their legitimate support was strong), and then the entirety of power.

The failure of the administration—which held the first and only chance for transition to democracy—to do any work regarding transitional justice concentrated power and wealth in the hands of the former elite. Later, in 2003, it was transferred from father to son through hereditary succession. Komsomol members began to replace the communist party elite.

As a result of this, the transition from totalitarianism to democracy did not occur. On the contrary, authoritarianism grew even stronger, and a de-facto "one-man" regime was formed. This regime continues the activities of its predecessors merely under a new name and form, but with the same essential methods.

Therefore, this process is not a national salvation. Calling it a "revenge" of the former repressive regime and the communist elite is correct from every perspective.

The failure to complete the transition to democracy during the Elchibey administration and the return of former communists to power [created] a negative [perception/attitude] towards democratisation in public opinion...