Why aren't Azerbaijanis protesting?

Opposition rally in Baku, September 11, 2016. Photo by Aziz Karimov for the 'Caucasian Knot'.

While neighboring countries have recently been scenes of significant public mobilization, with thousands of people taking to the streets in both Georgia and Iran, Azerbaijan presents a contrasting picture of public calm. This relative quiet in the face of regional and domestic pressures raises a critical question for regional observers: Why are Azerbaijanis not protesting? The answer is not simple, lying at the intersection of historical memory, political strategy, and the conditioned political psychology of a nation navigating a complex post-war reality.

It will first explore the country's vibrant history of political activism to establish that the current situation is a relatively recent development. The analysis will then examine the key events and trends that led to a sharp decline in public trust and political engagement. Finally, it will assess the contemporary socio-political dynamics—including state strategies and socio-economic pressures—that currently suppress large-scale public mobilization. Understanding this history is essential to grasping the nuanced reasons behind the silence.

1. A History of Activism: The Era of Public Engagement

The current political quiet in Azerbaijan is not an innate condition but a manufactured one, contrasting sharply with a history of robust and consequential civic engagement that lasted until the early 2000s. During this era, Azerbaijani citizens were far more politically active, participating in street protests and elections with a sense of agency. According to Samira Gasimli, political psychologist, this was because citizens felt like subjects of the political process, possessed self-confidence, and believed that their voice and behavior seriously influenced political processes.

This era established a political memory of public agency, built upon the building blocks of several pivotal moments where collective action directly shaped the nation's trajectory.

• The 1992 Protests: Following the Xocalı tragedy, mass rallies fueled by public outrage exerted immense pressure on the government, ultimately compelling President Ayaz Mütəllibov to resign in March 1992. This event demonstrated the tangible power of collective action.

• The 1992 Presidential Election: The subsequent election in June 1992 is remembered as the most intense political competition in Azerbaijan's history. It culminated in a victory for Abülfəz Elçibəy of the Azerbaijani Popular Front, who secured 59.4% of the vote against four other candidates. The intensity of the contest was underscored by the performance of his main rival, Nizami Süleymanov, who secured a significant 33% of the vote.

• The 2003 Post-Election Protests: The announcement of İlham Əliyev's victory in the 2003 presidential election triggered mass opposition protests. Supporters of the opposition gathered to contest the results, leading to a bloody clash in Azadliq square and subsequent mass arrests, marking a violent and decisive turning point in the state's tolerance for public dissent.

These events illustrate a time when the Azerbaijani public believed in its power to effect change. However, the aftermath of this activism, particularly the events of 2003, signaled the beginning of a new era characterized by a systematic erosion of political trust.

2. The Erosion of Trust: How Political Faith Was Lost

The decline in public protest was not a singular event but a systemic erosion of trust in the country's political processes and leadership. This was the result of a symbiotic dysfunction: consistent state actions suppressed dissent and created a political vacuum, while the opposition's own chronic failures amplified the effects of that repression, trapping the public in a cycle of disillusionment.

Each period of heightened activism was followed by state "repressions" that systematically weakened the opposition and discouraged future mobilization. The aftermath of the 2003 protests, with its mass arrests, was a particularly powerful deterrent. Furthermore, a consistent criticism has been that the ruling party misuses state resources — including TV, the press, and security and administrative structures — to undermine political rivals during election periods. This has fostered a deep-seated public perception that the political playing field is fundamentally uneven, making meaningful electoral change seem unattainable.

Compounding the effects of state pressure was the chronic fragmentation and strategic missteps of the opposition itself. Over two decades, a wide array of opposition electoral blocs formed, only to collapse, fostering an image of disunity and internal discord. Some notable examples include:

• Bizim Azərbaycan Bloku (Our Azerbaijan Bloc)

• Azadlıq Bloku (Freedom Bloc)

• AXCP-Müsavat

This constant churn of ephemeral alliances and collapsed blocs projected an image of chaos, preventing the formation of any long-term public trust in an alternative political vision. Furthermore, strategic decisions, such as the 2008 election boycott by major opposition forces, served to further distance citizens from the political process. By opting out of the contest, the opposition effectively ceded the political stage and reinforced a sense of inevitability about the outcome, leaving many potential supporters feeling abandoned.

The dual pressures of state repression and a persistently disorganized opposition had a devastating cumulative effect. According to analysis from a political psychologist, these factors led to the death of citizens' "trust in political institutions" and, crucially, their "confidence in themselves" as agents of political change. This created a profound sense of political alienation, where participation in protests or elections came to be seen as futile and even dangerous, paving the way for the widespread apathy observed today.

3. Managing Discontent in Post-War Azerbaijan

The historical erosion of political trust provides the foundation for the current quiet, but the contemporary landscape is maintained by a distinct set of economic, psychological, and political factors. In the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War, the government has adeptly managed public sentiment, leveraging national pride while underlying grievances simmer beneath the surface. This section examines the modern tools and conditions that sustain the status quo of public passivity.

The government has effectively utilized the "victory euphoria" following the 2020 war as a powerful tool for national unity and political distraction. The leadership strategically works to keep this euphoria alive to ensure that public focus remains on national triumph rather than on pressing social problems and discontent. This strategy is evident in several high-profile actions, such as President İlham Əliyev’s frequent visits to Shusha and the liberated territories and the promotion of large-scale reconstruction projects like the Füzuli airport. These initiatives serve as constant reminders of the historic victory, reinforcing a narrative of national strength that helps overshadow deteriorating economic conditions.

Despite the celebratory atmosphere, the social condition of the population is seriously deteriorating, with many citizens facing significant economic hardship. However, this has not translated into mass protest for a crucial reason: the situation has not yet crossed the threshold required for a "social explosion." While conditions are poor, analysis suggests that the population "can get by" and is not "starving." This ability to meet basic, albeit minimal, needs creates a buffer against the kind of widespread desperation that often fuels social upheaval. Public dissatisfaction exists, but for now, the economic pain has not become politically intolerable on a mass scale.

Perhaps the most significant obstacle to public mobilization is a deep-seated psychological barrier. A key reason for the lack of action is the widespread belief that there is no political force that people can believe in to lead a mass political protest. The historical failures and fragmentation of the opposition have left a vacuum of credible leadership, resulting in an environment of distrust and insecurity.

The result is that citizens feel "helpless," caught between a powerful state and an ineffective opposition. Their political reaction is consequently privatized, limited to "discussion among themselves." This dynamic is captured in a survey by the "Impuls" independent research center. This finding reveals the central paradox of modern Azerbaijani society: a population that is overwhelmingly politically aware, with 81% being politically informed, but simultaneously feels collectively powerless to act, channeling its discontent into private discussion rather than public demonstration.

This combination of managed euphoria, economic buffers, and psychological paralysis sets the stage for a fragile and unpredictable political stasis.

4. Conclusion: A Latent Potential for Mobilization

The absence of mass protest in modern Azerbaijan is the result of a complex interplay of factors cultivated over two decades.

 The primary drivers of this public apathy are the historical erosion of trust in both state institutions and political leaders, the persistent fragmentation of the opposition, effective state management of public discourse, and the strategic use of the Second Karabakh War victory to distract from socio-economic hardship. While political awareness among the populace remains high, pervasive feelings of helplessness and the lack of a credible opposition leadership create a formidable barrier to collective action.

However, it would be a mistake to interpret this quiet as permanent consent. The spontaneous protests that erupted in July 2020 after the death of General Polad Həşimov serve as a powerful reminder of the public's latent potential for mobilization. That event acted as a "spark" that ignited "subconsciously accumulated anger," bringing thousands into the streets in a brief, violent resurfacing of a nearly forgotten political agency. It revealed that beneath the surface of apathy lies a reservoir of frustration that can be rapidly activated by a sufficiently potent trigger. While organized political protest is currently dormant, the underlying social and psychological pressures suggest that public discontent remains a potent, if latent, force in Azerbaijani society.